Individuals with trypophobia have an aversion towards clusters of roughly circular shapes, such as those on a sponge or the bubbles on a cup of coffee. It is unclear why the condition exists, given the harmless nature of typical eliciting stimuli. We suggest that aversion to clusters is an evolutionarily prepared response towards a class of stimuli that resemble cues to the presence of parasites and infectious disease. Trypophobia may be an exaggerated and overgeneralised version of this normally adaptive response. (...) Consistent with this explanation, individuals with trypophobia, as well as comparison individuals, reported aversion towards disease-relevant cluster stimuli, but only the trypophobic group reported aversion towards objectively harmless cluster stimuli that had no relevance to disease. For both groups the level of aversion reported was predicted uniquely by a measure of disgust sensitivity. Scaled emotion ratings and open-ended responses revealed that the aversive response was predominantly based on the disease avoidance emotion, disgust. Many open-ended responses also described skin sensations. These findings support the proposal that individuals with trypophobia primarily perceive cluster stimuli as cues to ectoparasites and skin-transmitted pathogens. (shrink)

Constructive Neutral Evolution is an evolutionary mechanism that can explain much molecular inter-dependence and organismal complexity without assuming positive selection favoring such dependency or complexity, either directly or as a byproduct of adaptation. It differs from but complements other non-selective explanations for complexity, such as genetic drift and the Zero Force Evolutionary Law, by being ratchet-like in character. With CNE, purifying selection maintains dependencies or complexities that were neutrally evolved. Preliminary treatments use it to explain specific genetic and molecular structures (...) or processes, such as retained gene duplications, the spliceosome, and RNA editing. Here we aim to expand the scope of such explanation beyond the molecular level, integrating CNE with Multi-Level Selection theory, and arguing that several popular higher-level selection scenarios are in fact instances of CNE. Suitably contextualized, CNE occurs at any level in the biological hierarchy at which natural selection as normally construed occurs. As examples, we focus on modularity in protein–protein interaction networks or “interactomes,” the origin of eukaryotic cells and the evolution of co-dependence in microbial communities—a variant of the “Black Queen Hypothesis” which we call the “Gray Queen Hypothesis”. (shrink)

Quentin Smith contends that modern science provides enough evidence ‘to justify the belief that the universe began to exist without being caused to do so.’There was a time when such a claim would have been dismissed because it conflicts with a principle absolutely fundamental to all human thought, including science itself. As Thomas Reid expressed the matter:That neither existence, nor any mode of existence, can begin without an efficient cause is a principle that appears very early in the mind of (...) man; and it is so universal, and so firmly rooted in human nature, that the most determined scepticism cannot eradicate it. (shrink)

Quentin Smith contends that modern science provides enough evidence ‘to justify the belief that the universe began to exist without being caused to do so.’ There was a time when such a claim would have been dismissed because it conflicts with a principle absolutely fundamental to all human thought, including science itself. As Thomas Reid expressed the matter: That neither existence, nor any mode of existence, can begin without an efficient cause is a principle that appears very early in the (...) mind of man; and it is so universal, and so firmly rooted in human nature, that the most determined scepticism cannot eradicate it. (shrink)

I propose to examine what I take to be the point at issue between subjectivist and objectivist theories of ethics and to explain that the controversy between them is unreal. It springs from a misunderstanding of the nature of appraisal sentences. What I hope to show is that if such sentences were really analysable in the way in which the critics and many of the supporters of subjectivist theories suppose, then those theories would indeed, as it is sometimes put “fail (...) to do justice to the facts of moral experience.” But it seems to me that objectivist theories are no better off. They make exactly the same mistake though in a more sophisticated way. I therefore propose to see whether any useful results can be achieved by construing appraisal sentences on rather different lines. By appraisal sentences I mean sentences of the form “I approve of …, I think well of …, I commend …, etc.” I shall call these simple appraisals, sentences of the form “… is good, … is meritorious, … is praiseworthy, etc.” I shall call these moral appraisals. In these terms, subjectivist theories assert that moral appraisals can always be expressed without change of meaning by simple appraisals, though perhaps the addition of an imperative sentence of some kind is required to complete the translation. Objectivist theories deny this possibility and claim that moral appraisals assert truths about the independent world and not psychological facts about the speaker. (shrink)

What is at stake in the dispute between moral objectivism and subjectivism is how we are to give a rational grounding to ethical first principles or basic commitments. The search is for an explanation of what if anything makes any commitments good. Subjectivisms such as Blackburn's quasi‐realism can give any set of commitments no ‘rational grounding’ in this sense except in considerations about internal consistency. But this is inadequate. Internal consistency is not sufficient for ethical rationality, since a set of (...) obviously bad commitments could be internally consistent. Nor is it necessary, since a set of obviously good commitments could be internally inconsistent. I therefore argue for an objectivist view of the grounding of commitments, taking them to be attitudes which get their rationality, or lack of it, from their responsiveness to natural human needs and well‐being. Since this view is objectivist, it avoids the problems which face subjectivism. (shrink)

Developing a British perspective on the abortion debate, I take up some ideas from Patrick Lee’s fine paper, and pursue, in particular, the idea of individual humans as goods in themselves. I argue that this notion helps us to avoid the familiar mistake of making moral value impersonal. It also shows us the way out of consequentialism. Since the most philosophically viable notion of the person, the individual human, is (as Lee argues) a notion of an individual substance that is (...) there from conception, the move has a third effect, which is to rule out abortion. (shrink)

Constructive Neutral Evolution theory provides selectively neutral explanations of the origin and maintenance of biological complexity. This essay provides an analysis of CNE as an explanatory strategy defined by a tripartite set of conditions, and shows how this applies to cases of the evolution of complexity at higher-levels of the biological hierarchy. CNE was initially deployed to help explain a variety of complex molecular structures and processes, including spliceosomal splicing, trypansomal pan-editing, scrambled genes in ciliates, duplicate gene retention and fungal (...) ATP synthetase structure. CNE has also been generalized to apply to phenomena at the cellular level, including protein-protein interaction network modularity, obligate microbial symbioses, eukaryogenesis and microbial unculturability. This essay further extends CNE to cases of complexity at levels of organization higher than the molecular and cellular. These are multicellular phenotypic complexity, multicellular ecological complexity and, some cases of cultural complexity. (shrink)

I distinguish two claims about human ‘dominion’ over nature: (1) Humans have the right to supervise, manage, and direct the rest of nature; (2) Humans have a special value, superior to the rest of nature. I discuss some ways of rejecting either or both claims, and point to some surprising consequences of such rejections. Then I compare the ways in which Aristotelianism and sentientism might try to keep hold of both claims. This produces two surprising and unwelcome results for sentientism, (...) and one surprising and welcome result for Aristotelianism (namely, an alliance with Kantianism). And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. (Genesis 1.28). (shrink)

From the point of view of dialectical materialism, philosophy lies somewhere between the extremes of speculative metaphysics and logical analysis. It has a real object--the most general laws of nature, society, and thought; it attains this object, however, not independently of the special sciences, but only through a logical analysis of its results. Since philosophy studies reality only indirectly, through the sciences, it should be called philosophy of science rather than philosophy of nature. The first task of the philosopher is (...) to analyze the basic concepts of science: space, time, motion, cause. Most of the book is devoted to this task. Space is given a historical survey consisting of short accounts of what various people have said about it, and attributes to Lenin a curious concept of pseudo-absolute space. The discussion of time is organized differently, i.e., by type: absolute, relative, relativistic, biological, and Lenin's pseudo-absolute. Problems of simultaneity and direction of time are touched upon. Causality as a necessary, asymmetrical relation between two coexisting events is defended. The final part of the book is devoted to problems of measurement, relativity, and observation. The aim of the chapter on relativity is to show that this theory supports Lenin's doctrine that "the absolute is in the relative." Observability as the criterion of reality is rejected. Observation is important only as the beginning of knowledge and is transcended in the discovery of general laws. As a whole the book is disappointing because it sacrifices depth to breadth.--T. D. Z. (shrink)

A correspondence allows application of Landau and Lifshitz’ formulation of Le Chatelier’s principle from statistical physics to a simple 2-D model of biological symbiosis. The insight: symbionts stabilize the occupation of narrow peaks on fitness landscape.

What MacKinnon offers here is a provocative and original analysis of the meaning of the word "true." His applications are in the areas of statements in general, scientific theories, and theological propositions. One reason for the interest of the book can be found in MacKinnon’s intellectual odyssey. Setting out from a starting-point of standard neo-scholastic textbook philosophy and theology, MacKinnon has come to a highly personal synthesis to which he is willing at least tentatively to apply the label, "ontological pragmatism." (...) Stages along the way—and elements in the synthesis—include Bernard Lonergan’s transcendental Thomism, Wilfrid Sellars’ neo-Kantian version of analytical epistemology, and much detailed work of MacKinnon’s own in analytical philosophy of science. The provocative character of Truth and Expression is likely to bring criticism of the author for misuse of his sources. Wittgensteinian philosophical therapists are likely to bemoan MacKinnon’s relapse into ontologism, even if he qualifies it as a "pragmatic" version. Sellars is likely to object to being lumped with Lonergan, and the latter would probably be upset with the uses to which his former student has put his insights. It may also be worthwhile here to express a demur or two with respect to MacKinnon’s use of his Thomistic sources, e.g., concerning his theory of meaning. It seems that MacKinnon has accepted too naively what might best be called "textbook Thomism." It is true that Aquinas offers a mentalist view, and true also that both Aristotle and Aquinas speak of words as signs of concepts. While this can give rise to a private-language mentalism of the kind Wittgenstein would criticize, it must be recalled that Aristotle and Aquinas were writing not only before Wittgenstein but also before Kant. Whatever can be said of Aquinas’ "mentalism," it is certainly true that in other contexts Aquinas has a social theory of learning that is, at least on the surface, incompatible with a private language theory. Again, with respect to theological truth it seems likely that MacKinnon has been misled by Thomistic manuals, at least when he claims that what Aquinas offers is "a geometrically ordered deductive system" in which "the primacy of Jesus as a revelation of God does not fit." Historical studies of the function of his Summa Theologiae in Aquinas’ scheme for theological education do not support the view of Aquinas as a theological deductive system builder. Nor is it true, as MacKinnon seems to hold, that Aquinas’ view of theological truth is more Aristotelian than biblical. Aside from these qualifications on his use of sources, MacKinnon’s book offers an abundance of critical thinking, analytical insight, and systematic ability. For instance, the reader interested in MacKinnon’s original approach to an adequate epistemology of science will here, in chapter three of Truth and Expression, find the best summary yet of his many contributions in that area. Whether or not, in the last analysis, MacKinnon’s synthesis will be historically significant remains to be seen. What seems likely now is that if it does, the ingredient elements of Lonergen, [[sic]] Sellars, Wittgenstein, Quine, etc., will be more muted, and MacKinnon’s own synthesis will stand on its own. Meanwhile, Truth and Expression will serve as the best guide, pointing in the direction we can expect MacKinnon to follow in the future.—P. T. D. (shrink)

Australia and New Zealand boast an active community of scholars working in the field of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for their work. Each volume comprises a group of thematically-connected essays edited by scholars based in Australia or New Zealand with special expertise in that particular area. In each volume, a majority ofthe contributors are from Australia or New Zealand. Contributions from elsewhere are (...) by no means ruled out, however, and are actively encouraged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question. Earlier volumes in the series have been welcomed for significantly advancing the discussion of the topics they have dealt with. I believe that the present volume will be greeted equally enthusiastically by readers in many parts of the world. R. W. Home General Editor Australasian Studies in History And Philosophy of Science viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The majority of the papers in this collection had their origin in the 2001 Australasian Association for History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science annual conference, held at the University of Melbourne, where streams of papers on the themes of scientific realism and commonsense were organised. (shrink)

The statistical properties of a single quantum object and an ensemble of independent such objects are considered in detail for two-level systems. Computer simulations of dynamic zero-point quantum fluctuations for a single quantum object are reported and compared with analytic solutions for the ensemble case.

This book is designed as an introduction to several basic philosophic problems for high school students and college freshmen. The discussion of the uses of language, meaning and reference, truth and verification are clear, simple, and brief. Their purpose is to stimulate questions and further research rather than to provide solutions. This purpose is admirably achieved.--T. D. Z.

These remarkable memoirs were published first in Russian in 1953 and were translated into French in 1964. At last they are available in English in a very readable translation. The author was on friendly terms with Lenin in Geneva from January to June 1904, a period of great stress in Lenin's life when he was writing One Step Forward, Two Steps Back. The human, all too human, side of the great historical figure is vividly and sympathetically portrayed. Lenin was fascinated (...) with violence, but always kept himself at a safe distance from it. His vanity and pride made him incapable of frankness. His ignorance of Shakespeare, Byron, Molière, Schiller, and his enthusiasm for Chernyshevsky's What is to be Done? reflect his intellectual narrowness. He was incapable of grasping a fresh idea, or of respecting any person who disagreed with his convictions. No tactics were too low in settling personal scores. Among his more appealing characteristics one might mention his firm faith in the Russian Revolution, his energy and dedication to his work, his love of music, nature, and physical activity. But the book contains much more than a new and clear-headed insight into Lenin's intellectual development and personality. There are vivid descriptions of many leaders of the Revolution, of the oppressive atmosphere of life in exile, of the discrepancy between hopes and reality. The personality of the author, his fairness, sincerity, and honesty, are stamped on the whole book making it an entertaining and rewarding experience.--T. D. Z. (shrink)

This book is an excellent general introduction to existentialist thought. It organizes the subject-matter under traditional philosophic disciplines beginning with an account of the method and proceeding to ontology, epistemology, ethics, social and religious thought. The author concentrates on the writings of the leading figures in the movement--Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Marcel, Sartre, Jaspers--and delineates the areas of agreement and disagreement among them. The arrangement of materials around traditional problems facilitates the detection of changes in approach, emphasis, and formulation. The most important (...) aspect of the book lies in the attempt to view the movement as a part of the philosophical tradition, to explain the methods and doctrines against which the Existentialists react as well as their heroes in the tradition. The achievements of the movement are measured against its claims, and its major deficiencies are pointed out in the last chapter. Throughout the book the author manages to preserve a clarity and economy that are a welcome contrast to the style of existentialist writings.--T. D. Z. (shrink)

This introduction to the philosophy of science includes six chapters, each taking up a single problem—though the last four constitute something of a package: three attempts to establish Schlesinger’s criterion of confirmability, four applies it to non-confirmable sentences in such a way as to provide an alternative to the Wittgensteinian "received view" about the meaningless of self-referring sentences; in the process Schlesinger defends a version of neo-verificationism which, in five and six, he attempts to show is nontrivial by applying it (...) to the discussion of the nature of time and of determinism. To complete the list, chapter two discusses confirmation and parsimony ; and chapter one is introductory, discussing Niced’s criterion and Hempel’s paradox in terms of "the most simple type of generalization... ‘All ravens are black'... found mainly in elementary science or commonsense, prescientific reasoning". (shrink)

From the point of view of dialectical materialism, philosophy lies somewhere between the extremes of speculative metaphysics and logical analysis. It has a real object--the most general laws of nature, society, and thought; it attains this object, however, not independently of the special sciences, but only through a logical analysis of its results. Since philosophy studies reality only indirectly, through the sciences, it should be called philosophy of science rather than philosophy of nature. The first task of the philosopher is (...) to analyze the basic concepts of science: space, time, motion, cause. Most of the book is devoted to this task. Space is given a historical survey consisting of short accounts of what various people have said about it, and attributes to Lenin a curious concept of pseudo-absolute space. The discussion of time is organized differently, i.e., by type: absolute, relative, relativistic, biological, and Lenin's pseudo-absolute. Problems of simultaneity and direction of time are touched upon. Causality as a necessary, asymmetrical relation between two coexisting events is defended. The final part of the book is devoted to problems of measurement, relativity, and observation. The aim of the chapter on relativity is to show that this theory supports Lenin's doctrine that "the absolute is in the relative." Observability as the criterion of reality is rejected. Observation is important only as the beginning of knowledge and is transcended in the discovery of general laws. As a whole the book is disappointing because it sacrifices depth to breadth.--T. D. Z. (shrink)

The author's aim is to show that Leontev's ideas are not disconnected, as many critics have held, but form a system that is both logically consistent and interconnected by the "inner logic" of a powerful emotion. To uncover the emotional sources of Leontev's philosophy, half the book is devoted to Leontev's life, and especially his relation to his mother. Since childhood, he feared and loved her, and associated her with religion, refinement, and absolutism. Leontev's first formulation of his doctrine of (...) aestheticism when he returned from the Crimean War probably coincided with his first suspicions of his homosexuality. His unexpected marriage to his former mistress was an attempt to overcome his guilt and weakness. His first ideological work, Byzantism and Slavdom was written under the double strain of his mother's death, and his own experience of fear of death during an illness. Leontev's doctrine of aestheticism when applied to the individual, yields "a poetry of life" beyond good and evil. One's personal life must be maximally original, complex, and unified at whatever cost in happiness to oneself or others. Religious faith is needed to reconcile one with suffering and death. Yet, religion dictates an ethics which conflicts with the aesthetics of life. The constant struggle between the two principles enriches personality and heightens creativity, and must finally end in a heroic total rejection of aesthetics. Applied to society and history, aestheticism demands a society stratified into unequal and hostile classes and unified by ruthless despotism. Such a society was to be most conducive to the development of original personalities. The egalitarian, happiness-orientated West was in decline and sacrificed beauty to banality. Without much confidence in its realization, Leontev advocated "freeze up Russia" to avoid infection from the West.--T. D. Z. (shrink)

This book is designed for an introductory course in logic on the freshman-sophomore level. The approach to logic through set theory is justified by the fundamental importance of set theory in mathematics, and by the fact that most students entering college are acquainted with set theory. The author begins by explaining the basic notions and laws of set theory, and shows how the four standard types of propositions are translated into the notation of set theory. Propositional logic is introduced and (...) related to set theory by interpreting truth-tables in terms of sets and subsets. A simplified first order functional calculus is developed without quantifiers by using an unconventional notation resembling that of set theory as closely as possible. The nature and techniques of deductive proof are treated at length. Beyond these formal topics there are interesting discussions of the application of logical laws in ordinary language arguments, in probability theory, and in circuit theory. The material is organized in units suitable for fifty minute classes with excellent exercises at the end of each unit. Answers are provided to half the questions in the exercises to allow the student to test himself. The book ends with a brief note on scientific discovery and axiomatics.--T. D. Z. (shrink)

This book spans roughly a century, 1860-1960, of Russian thought on the subject of God, and focuses on ten thinkers who formulated distinctive and extreme views on the subject. The connections and similarities among these highly original thinkers are admirably traced, and give an unexpected unity to the book. Bakunin, the "political anarchist," and Tolstoy, the "cultural anarchist" rejected the State, Church, and God to free men either from oppression by others or from the fear of death and oppression of (...) others. Their critique of religion had a powerful influence on the Russian Marxists. Leontyev and Rozanov, the "religious neo-conservatives" reacted against European humanism and Tolstoy's "tyranny of ethics." Both turned to the Old Testament for inspiration and support. Leontyev discovered there a faith based on the fear of God the Judge. Rozanov found a religion of joy based on the mystery of procreation and God as the loving Father. Reversing Bakunin's "if God exists, then man is a slave" the "religious existentialists," Shestov and Berdyaev, held that "if man is free, then God exists." They attempted to give a religious foundation for human freedom and values by attacking the supremacy of reason and its necessary truths. Gorky and Lunacharsky, the left wing of the Bolshevik faction, replaced God with a future mankind which is to be perfected gradually in history by the combined efforts of men. These "God-builders" were quickly silenced by Lenin. While Plekhanov remained faithful to Marx in treating religion as a historically determined illusion which will simply wither away in the socialist society, Lenin saw it as a sinister tool in the class struggle, and proclaimed total war on religion. The last chapter investigates the policies of the Soviet government toward the churches and sects, and recent interest in religious ideas among Soviet writers. Each of the mentioned thinkers receives a special section. Although some important thinkers, such as Solovyov, Dostoevsky, Fyodorov, do not get full attention, their influence is made clear. The author's style has a lucidity and simplicity which are a mark of complete mastery of subject matter.--T. D. Z. (shrink)

The author presents an ethical theory which, as he admits, has much in common with the theories of M. Cohen, R. Sellars, H. Feigl, C. Lamont, and G. Williams. His first task is to define the scientific world view on which his ethical conclusions will be based. It comprises the following suppositions, logically derived from and justified by scientific practice: there is a real world independent of the knower, natural events are uniform, every event is related to some other events, (...) everything is in constant change, all changes are orderly, causes are efficient not final. Before the good life can be defined, science must define human nature, i.e., man's basic and universal needs, which are: physical health, recognition, love, excitement and novelty, knowledge. The good life must satisfy all these needs, but since this may be done improperly, a condition must be added: that satisfaction must come from a real adjustment to the environment in the long run. Moral rules must be both happiness-producing and life-promoting. This framework allows for diversity in moral codes. Determinism does not conflict with morality, for the only freedom that morality presupposes is the absence of external or irrational causes. An act is free to the extent that it is determined by the agent's self-knowledge. The book ends with a brief discussion of the problems of overpopulation, pollution, and world-scale planning.--T. D. Z. (shrink)

The Malabo Declaration places the transformation of agriculture and food systems at the centre of regional and national policy priorities across Africa. Transformative change in the way that food is produced, processed and consumed is seen as not only necessary for addressing the complex challenges of food security and poverty alleviation, but also as a driver of new employment opportunities and economic development. As pointed out within the recent UN Food Systems Summit, essential elements of food system transformations include digital (...) transitions and the empowerment of women and youth. However, there are few empirical examples demonstrating how these agendas come together to affect food system change. Here we focus on an enterprising group of young farmers referred to as Malawi’s new achikumbe elite, who are urban based, educated and engaging in agriculture on a commercial basis. The aim is to characterise this emergent group of agriculturalists and to understand the role that they have within the transformation of Malawi-s agricultural sector. We explore how digital platforms are supporting the emergence of this new category of farmer and positioning young people as agents of change in food systems transformation. Based on interviews and ethnographic research with 32 young farmers between 2018 and 2022 combined with interviews with representatives of service providers and agricultural organisations, we argue that this group is characterised by a higher level of education, self-dependency and use of digital platforms, enabling them to adapt their context to sourcing production resources and engaging in commercial agriculture. We present evidence that digital platforms are supporting the new achikumbe elite (NAE) to engage flexibly with new commercial markets, contracts and access a wider range of training and advice. However, while digital platforms can offer more equitable access to information and market opportunities, they also represent potential avenues for food system transformations that are inequitable. As such, we argue that there is need for digital technologies to mitigate against potential inequalities. (shrink)

In the 1970s, R.D. MacElroy coined the term ‘extremophile’ to describe microorganisms that thrive under extreme conditions (MacElroy 1974). This hybrid word transliterates to ‘love of extremes’ and has been studied as a straightforward concept for the past 40 years. In this paper, we discuss several ways the term has been understood in the scientific literature, each of which has different consequences for the distribution and importance of extremophiles. They are, briefly, Human-Centric, at the Edge of life’s habitation of Morphospace, (...) by appeal to Statistical Rarity, described by Objective Limits, and at the Limits of Impossibility for metabolic processes. Importantly, these concepts have co-existed, unacknowledged and conflated, for decades. Confusion and equivocation threaten to follow from the wildly varied inclusion or exclusion of organisms as extremophiles depending on the concept used. Under some conceptions, entire kinds of extremophiles become meaningless. Since our understanding of how life works is shaped by what we take to be its extremes, clarifying extremophily is key for many large-scale projects in biology, ecology, biotechnology and astrobiology. In what follows, we proceed as if a noncontroversial account of life is possible and that it is possible to find complex chemistry in the Universe that is similar enough to Life on Earth such that both may be considered instances of ‘life’ (but see Mariscal & Doolittle 2018). We raise, but do not address, the questions of whether the distribution of Life on Earth is representative of what we may find elsewhere in the Universe, whether the same kinds of extremophiles would exist given a replay of the tape of life. Additionally, each of these concepts assumes life based on some sort of biochemistry in this universe, effectively setting aside claims made by some artificial life proponents that their digital organisms are genuine examples of life (Langton 1989, Ray 1995). On the distinction between extremophilic and extremotolerant, we note that all accounts accept the latter as a broader category than the former, since ‘phily’ means love and tolerance is a prerequisite for love under any conception. Indeed, there will be many extremely impoverished environments where tolerance is the only option and thriving is precluded, e.g. Bacillus marismortui was extracted and grown from 250-million-year-old salt crystals in the Permian Salado Formation in an inactive yet persistent state (Vreeland et al., 2000). We also note that extremophily, as a functional category, is potentially applicable at many levels of the biological hierarchy. Extremophily at one level does not necessarily extend to higher and lower levels. For instance, a microorganism in isolation might be quite intolerant to certain environmental conditions yet flourish when subjected to the same conditions as a community or natural biofilm. Alternatively, a protein molecule might be quite stable or active under certain conditions even if the optimal environment for the organism containing it is far more mesophilic. There is an industry of artificially selecting organisms and proteins to adapt to extreme environments (see van den Burg & Eijsink 2002), providing some justification to consider ‘functioning at extremes’ as a worthwhile category of investigation. Finally, we also note certain physico-chemical ranges are rarely considered with respect to extremophily – timespan, size, nutrient availability (Hoehler & Jørgensen 2013), etc. – as well as some biological parameters – abundance, isolation, competition, etc. Perhaps scientific interest must also come into play as to the reason these criteria are not considered relevant. We return to this issue later. In the next section, we give five definitions of extremophily, show their benefits, drawbacks, and unintended yet unavoidable consequences. These arguments are summarized in Table 1 and represented visually in Figures 1 and 2. Given research on polyextremophiles, it seems Figure 2 is a more plausible representation of the state of current knowledge than Figure 1 (Harrison et al. 2013). Life is patchily distributed across various dimensions, which may reflect its contingent history, poor sampling, or (perhaps) fundamental limits. Figure 3 shows the conceptual flowchart for all of these views. In the following section, we take a step back to ask whether we should choose between these definitions and how such a judgment could be made. We argue for a limited pluralism, in which some, but not all, of the concepts are acceptable relative to certain practical and theoretical aims. (shrink)

IntroductionIn recent years, there has been something of an explosion of news stories about various college and university campuses across North America experiencing heightened levels of political advocacy and political unrest. Visible examples include the “canceling” of invited speakers who have been deemed offensive by select student groups1 or petitions calling for the removal of instructors who have been accused of using harmful language.2 While these examples shed light on some of the more intense political debates circulating in higher educational (...) institutions, they are also newsworthy stories precisely because they suggest strong divisiveness in worldviews in action—the contradiction between different…. (shrink)

Recent studies show that returning global health trainees often report having felt inadequately prepared to deal with ethical dilemmas they encountered during outreach clinical work. While global health training guidelines emphasize the importance of developing ethical and cultural competencies before embarking on fieldwork, their practical implementation is often lacking and consists mainly of recommendations regarding professional behavior and discussions of case studies. Evidence suggests that one of the most effective ways to teach certain skills in global health, including ethical and (...) cultural competencies, is through service learning. This approach combines community service with experiential learning. Unfortunately, this approach to global health ethics training is often unattainable due to a lack of supervision and resources available at host locations. This often means that trainees enter global health initiatives unprepared to deal with ethical dilemmas, which has the potential for adverse consequences for patients and host institutions, thus contributing to growing concerns about exploitation and “medical tourism.” From an educational perspective, exposure alone to such ethical dilemmas does not contribute to learning, due to lack of proper guidance. We propose that the tension between the benefits of service learning on the one hand and the respect for patients’ rights and well-being on the other could be resolved by the application of a simulation-based approach to global health ethics education. (shrink)

René Girard est mort dans la semaine qui précéda les attentats du 13 novembre 2015. Il avait écrit : "La violence essentielle revient sur nous de façon spectaculaire, non seulement sur le plan de l'histoire, mais sur le plan du savoir". L'auteur de "La Violence et le sacré" n'est pas un prophète de malheur. Sa pensée donne forme et sens à notre avenir. Il nous faut réentendre sa voix. J'ai dû répondre au choc qu'ont été ces événements conjoints : la (...) mort d'un maître et d'un ami, et les horreurs parisiennes. Ces deux réalités constituent une énigme où se confrontent l'invisible et le monstrueux, le secret et le sacré, l'élégance et l'obscénité. Elles m'ont forcé à évoquer les "derniers jours" : ceux de René Girard et la fin des temps qu'il pensa dans son oeuvre. Beaucoup se sont mépris sur son pessimisme. L'annonce d'un démembrement du monde révélait moins la mélancolie d'un romantique que le Royaume entrevu un soir d'été en Avignon ou dans le silence parfumé de Stanford. J'ai voulu rendre présent ce non-violent fondamental avec qui j'ai travaillé quinze ans, qui fut drôle et discret, dont l'espérance était profonde. La parole est vivante. La sienne et celle des textes qu'il sut génialement interpréter. L'Evangile, Shakespeare, Stendhal ou Proust garderont longtemps pour moi l'accent du Midi. (shrink)

Le dépassement du mythe du donné est au fondement de la conception mcdowellienne de la connaissance et de la pensée. En cela, McDowell prolonge l'analyse de Sellars. Il s'oppose cependant à la recherche, par ce dernier, d'une « pure sensation » comme élément causal de la connaissance. Celle-ci ne serait qu'un nouvel avatar du donné et tombe, d'après McDowell, sous le coup de la propre réfutation sellarsienne du mythe. Mais il reste possible de concevoir un donné déjà conceptuel. C'est ainsi (...) que peut être dépassé le mythe et c'est, d'après McDowell, ce que Kant, nonobstant les critiques que lui adresse Sellars, permet de penser. Toutefois, McDowell lui-même ne tombe-t-il pas dans une autre version du mythe du donné, à propos de ce que Sellars appelle le donné catégorial ? Nous montrerons que cette accusation, élevée notamment par Rosenberg, méconnaît le sens du donné conceptuel proposé par McDowell. The rebuking of the myth of the given lies at the foundation of McDowell's epistemology and philosophy of mind. He follows Sellars in this path, yet rejects Sellars' solution of a « sheer sensation » as the basis of knowledge and thought. Such a sheer sensation only is a new form of the myth, it falls under Sellars' own refutation of the myth. Something merely causal cannot contribute to knowledge or thought. Yet, it is possible to conceive of an already conceptual given. According to McDowell, this is the way to overcome the myth, a way already shown by Kant. But does McDowell himself not fall prey to another version of the myth, the myth of the categorial given, as Sellars puts it? I will show that this accusation, professed by Rosenberg among others, rests on a misunderstanding of what McDowell means by conceptual. (shrink)

Quels sont les ressorts profonds de la grave crise économique, sociale et politique que nous traversons? Quelles lignes de fracture souterraines révèle-t-elle? Ces questions ont fait l'objet d'une journée de réflexion organisée à l'occasion du 60e anniversaire de la disparition du philosophe Emmanuel Mounier à l'âge de 45 ans, le 22 mars 1950. Vingt ans durant, le fondateur de la revue Esprit n'a cessé de passer au feu de la critique les politiques et idéologies aboutissant à la négation de la (...) personne, coeur vivant du personnalisme, sa doctrine. A l'origine de ces perversions : une erreur sur l'homme. Mounier l'identifie dès ses premiers textes consacrés à la crise des années 1930. Crise financière, crise économique, certes, mais plus en profondeur, " crise morale " et " spirituelle ". Elle se manifeste par le primat de l'argent déconnecté de l'économie réelle dans une délirante " autofécondité ", l'instrumentalisation du travail, la domination et les inégalités, la prolifération de besoins factices... 500 personnes dont 150 scolaires et étudiants ont participé à cette belle journée de débats qui s'est également interrogée sur l'influence internationale actuelle de la pensée de Mounier. (shrink)

Microbiologists are transitioning from the study and characterization of individual strains or species to the profiling of whole microbiomes and microbial ecology. Equipped with high-throughput methods for studying the taxonomic and functional characteristics of diverse samples, they are just beginning to encounter the conceptual, theoretical, and experimental problems of comparing taxonomy to function, and extracting useful measures from such comparisons. Although still unresolved, these problems are well studied in macro-ecology and are reiterated here as an historical precautionary for microbial ecologists. (...) Beyond expected and unresolved terminological vagueness, we argue that assessments and comparisons of taxonomic and functional profiles in micro-ecology suffer from theoretically unresolvable arbitrariness and ambiguities. We divide these into problems of scale, individuation, and commensurability. We argue that there is no technically/theoretically “correct” scale, individuation, or comparison of taxonomy and function, but there are nonetheless better and worse methodologies for profiling. (shrink)

The objective of this study is the delineation of a philosophical tradition linking Epicurus’ ethical philosophy to Democritus. Specifically, Warren seeks to demonstrate that there is an ethical tradition of Democriteanism, anchored in atomism. Tracing its outlines demands extensive philosophical and philological sleuthing. It is inevitable that such a project will tell only a likely story for it is beset with challenges at virtually every stage. The challenges begin with Democritus himself. His ethical fragments, extensive in number, rest on the (...) insecure foundation of Stobaeus’ anthology and a collection known as The Sayings of Democrates. Is Democrates the familiar atomist from Abdera or someone else? Further, do the ethical fragments have any foundation in Democritean atomism? Warren admits that any claim of a foundation of Democritean ethics in his physics is only a conjecture. (shrink)

Le Yaoundé PhD Seminar-Theories of Justice est un séminaire international et pluridisciplinaire qui se tient depuis 2012 à Yaoundé. Il réunit des professeurs et des doctorants africains et non africains ainsi que des professionnels et des représentants de la société civile autour de questions de justice sociale et de politique publique. À l'initiative de doctorants africains et non africains, il a été mis en place conjointement par la Chaire Hoover de l'Université catholique de Louvain et par le Centre d’études et (...) de recherches sur la justice sociale et politique de l’Université catholique d’Afrique centrale dans le but de bâtir une véritable solidarité entre le Nord et le Sud dans le domaine de la formation académique et de la recherche. The Yaoundé PhD Seminar-Theories of Justice is an international and multidisciplinary seminar which is held since 2012 in Yaoundé. It brings together teachers and African and non-African doctoral students as well as professionals and representatives of civil society around issues of social justice and public policy. At the initiative of African and non-African students, it has been implemented jointly by the Hoover Chair of the Catholic University of Louvain and the Centre of studies and research on social justice and political of the Catholic University of Central Africa in order to build a genuine solidarity between the North and the South in the field of academic training and research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 263 articles, and supplementing his anthology of Wright (Liberal Arts Press). The biographical chapter presents Wright as an attractive character among devoted friends and also as a solitary, original scientist. Wright's primary achievement was to apply utilitarian principles to Darwinian natural selection theory. Since Darwin himself made no such attempt, nor did John Stuart Mill, and since Darwin showed an evident interest in Wright's attempt, this represents (...) a major contribution to evolutionary theory. On the negative side, too, Wright was incisive in his criticisms of Spencer, Mivart, Hamilton, Mansel, and Lewes. The pragmatic strains in Wright's philosophical method were incidental to his primary interest in showing that sciences are metaphysically "neutral." But his influence on Peirce and James was direct and strong, both on their cosmological and methodological doctrines. He deserves to be mentioned as the prime mover in this trinity of early pragmatism and naturalism, but since his own writings were relatively few and scattered, his historical importance rests largely on the use which Peirce and James made of his ideas and the development which they gave to his philosophy. HER~VRTW. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Propos sur Jules Lequier: Philosophe de la libert~--R~flexions sur sa vie et sur sa pens~e. Par s Callot. (Paris: l~ditions Marcel Rivi~re et Cie, 1962. Pp. 142 [1]. Biblioth6que Philosophique.) L'oeuvre de Jules Lequier est importante. Nos philosophes am~ricains Charles Hartshorne et William L. Reese en ont fait un grand ~loge dans leur Philosophers Speak of God (pp. ix, 17, 109, 118, 227-230). Dans ce nouveau livre I~mile Callot nous donne des rfiflexions, des considerations, vraiment des Propos sur Jules Lequier en occasion du centenaire de la mort de Lequier (1862). La vie de Lequier est incontestablement dramatique. N~ en 1814 en Br6tagne off il passa son enfance, Lequier subit l'influence de son pays natal, de sa m~re dont il ~tait le ills unique, et d'une 6ducation profond~ment catholique. I1 entra ~t l'l~cole Polytechnique et il en sortit peu apr~s. Mais il y connut Renouvier et c'est grace ~ Renouvier que la pens~e de Lequier nous est connue. Renouvier intercala dans ses livres des fragments de Lequier et en publia des bonnes pages sous ce titre La recherche d'une premiOre v~rit& A l'~ge de 37 ans Lequier eut un acc6s de dfimence. Puis il eut un amour exaltfi pour une jeune fille qui le refusa en mariage. Lequier mourut, noy~, ~t l'~ge de 48 ans. De sa fin il nous est impossible de savoir si elle a 6t~ un suicide ou un accident, mais Lequier garda toujours con- 264 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY science de son g6nie: "Je crois avoir trouv6 un myst~re merveilleux de simplicitY, de profondeur et de t~n6bres: quelque chose h quoi nul ne pense." Lequier est un philosophe de la libert& Tout philosophe part de l'id& de v~rit~, cela est n&essaire, mais la prudence exige qu'on la mette sans cesse en cause. Comme Vinet (1797-1847) a dit, "La v6rit~, sans la recherche de la verit6, n'est que la moiti~ de la v~rit& On ne salt bien que ce qu'on n'a pas su toujours; on ne croit bien qu'apr& avoir dour6; on n'est vainqueur qu'apr6s avoir &6 vaincu. Et c'est pourquoi, en cette mati~re, notre premier effort doit avoir pour objet de mettre l'homme en demeure de choisir." Lequier avait eu tr& fort le sentiment du d&erminisme universel. Mais, au moment oth la croyance ~ la n&essit6 semblait devoir triompher dans son esprit, il la rejetta brusquement "par une r&olte de l'&re entier." Selon Lequier, la premiere et fondamentale d6marche de l'esprit est une affirmation de la libert~ par la libert6 m~me. La libert~ ne cr& pas la v6rit6, mais la croyance en la libert6 est une premi6re v6rit6. Sans cette croyance, on ne peut rien chercher et rien d&ouvrir. Mais l'homme, auteur de ses actes par la libertY, ne l'est pas de sa libert& Le Dieu de la Bible est un &re infini qui rien ne peut &happer. Ainsi le probl6me entier de la pr6destination se pose ici de nouveau. Et Lequier d&ouvre une solution originale: Si Dieu... (shrink)

De unione Verbi incarnati est sans doute celle des Questions disputees qui a suscite parmi les disciples de saint Thomas d'Aquin les plus apres controverses. Seule en effet, elle mentionne, a cote de l'unique esse personnel du Christ, un autre etre de ce suppot, correspondant a la nature humaine. Comment concilier cette affirmation avec la doctrine thomasienne de l'unite d'etre substantiel? Et ne risque-t-elle pas de remettre en cause l'unite ontologique du Christ, et par la de detruire Jesus? Mais au-dela (...) de ces controverses, notre QuAestio revele l'emerveillement d'un contemplatif fascine par la nouveaute ineffable de l'Incarnation. 2000 ans apres la naissance du Christ, cette oeuvre puissante, publiee pour la premiere fois en edition latin-francais, ne pourra manquer de susciter un ardent interet. (shrink)

Research on motivation has mainly concentrated on the role of goal orientation and self?evaluation in conducting learning activities. In this paper, we examine the relative importance of teachers? teaching and their efficacy beliefs to explain variation in student motivation. Questionnaires were used to measure the well?being, academic self?efficacy, mastery goal orientation, performance avoidance, intrinsic motivation and school investment of students (n = 3462) and the teaching practices and teachers? sense of self?efficacy (n = 194) in primary schools. Results of the (...) multi?level analyses show that connection to the students? world and cooperative learning methods had a positive effect on students? motivation, while process?oriented instruction by the teacher had a negative effect on motivational behaviour and motivational factors of students. Finally, the results lend credence to the argument that teachers? sense of self?efficacy has an impact on both teachers? teaching and students? motivation to learn. (shrink)

Bruce Caldwell has disputed a number of points in my earlier account of the development of the Austrian school of economics from Carl Menger to Ludwig von Mises and F.A. Hayek. The issues in contention regard Friedrich von Wieser’s intellectual affiliation with Hayek and his influence on the formation of Hayek’s economic thought; Wieser’s status as a general equilibrium theorist; and the reason for Hayek’s early flirtation with general equilibrium theory. In this article I argue that Hayek was a self-conscious (...) adherent of the Wieserian tradition and remained so even after he received the Nobel Prize in 1974 and that he distinguished between this tradition and the Böhm-Bawerkian tradition followed by Ludwig von Mises. I also contend that Wieser used the construction of a general equilibrium economy subject to a single will as both a normative benchmark by which to appraise the performance of the real-world market economy and as an analytical tool to explain the formation of market prices. Finally, I argue that Hayek concerned himself with the problems of the Wieser-type general equilibrium economy beginning with his earliest writings as a professional economist, years before he began to focus on the theoretical problems of money and the business cycle.Bruce Caldwell a discuté un certain nombre de points de mon article récent sur le développement de l’école autrichienne d’économie de Carl Menger en passant par Ludwig von Mises et F.A. Hayek. Les controverses concernant l’affiliation intellectuelle de Hayek vis-à-vis de Friedrich von Wieser et l’influence de ce dernier sur la pensée économique de Hayek, le statut de Wieser en tant que théoricien de l’équilibre général, et les raisons pour lesquelles le jeune Hayek flirta avec la théorie de l’équilibre général.Dans cet article je défends la thèse selon laquelle Hayek était conscient du fait qu’il s’inscrivait dans la tradition Wieserienne et qu’il l’était toujours même après sa réception du prix Nobel en 1974 et quand il fît la distinction entre cette tradition et la tradition inaugurée par Böhm-Bawerk et poursuivie par Mises. L’article affirme aussi que Wieser utilisa la construction d’une économie en équilibre général sujette à une volonté unique à la fois comme standard normatif pour évaluer les performances des marchés dans le monde réel et comme outil analytique pour expliquer la formation des prix marchands. Enfin, l’article argumente que Hayek s’intéressa aux problèmes relevant d’une économie en équilibre général à la Wieser dans ses premiers écrits en tant qu’économiste et cela bien avant qu’il ne se concentrât sur les problèmes théoriques de la monnaie et du cycle des affaires. (shrink)

In Virgil's third eclogue, the goatherd Menalcas responds to his challenger Damoetas by offering as his wager in their contest of song a pair of embossed cups,caelatum diuini opus Alcimedontis, decorated with a pattern of vine and ivy. In the middle of this design, he says, are two figures. One is the astronomer Conon, and the other—at this point Menalcas, afflicted with a sudden loss of memory, professes to have forgotten the name of the second figure, and breaks off into (...) a question :quis fuit alter, | descripsit radio totum qui gentibus orbem, | tempora quae messor, quae curuus arator haberet?Various candidates for the identity of this second astronomer have been suggested, one of the most favoured being Eudoxus of Cnidus, whosePhaenomenahad been versified by the Hellenistic poet Aratus. In 1930 it was proposed by Léon Herrmann that Menalcas in fact answers his own question in his reference tocuruUS ARAToratEcl.3.42: the solution to Virgil's riddle is already written into the question, in the form of the anagram ofAratusconcealed within these two words. Strictly speaking, Hermann notes only that ‘Aratorau v. 42 évoque le nom d’Aratos’; he and later exponents of the theory tend to ignore the preceding ‘-us’—but there seems no reason to exclude it if an allusion to the Greek poet is to be seen in the two following syllables. (shrink)